COMMENTS

UNDOING A LESSON OF FEAR IN THE CLASSROOM:
THE LEGAL RECOURSE OF AIDS-LINKED CHILDREN
LISA J. SOTTOt

AIDS, implacable and thusfar incurable, comes as a shock.
It arrives like a cannibal at the picnic and calmly starts
eating the children.
-Morrow, Plague Mentality.*
This statement 1 characterizes the "epidemic of fear" we are presently experiencing as a result of the recent dramatic rise in cases of
acquired immunodeficiency syndrome, more commonly known as
AIDS.2 The American public has attached to this disease a stigma3 far
worse than that which the medical community believes is justified. Although medical experts have claimed "with assurance" that AIDS is
"an extremely difficult disease to catch"' and is not transmitted by casual contact, a recent poll shows that more than one half of the American public believes otherwise.5 Indeed, this Comment maintains that it
-B.A. 1984, Cornell University, College of Arts and Sciences; J.D. Candidate
1987, University of Pennsylvania.
* Morrow, The Start of a Plague Mentality, TIME, Sept. 23, 1985, at 92.
Id.
2 See Adler, The AIDS Conflict, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 23, 1985, at 18. The media
and others have played major roles in fueling fears about AIDS by referring to AIDS
as "the Black Death of the 20th century," National Democratic Policy Committee,
Memorial Bill for Emergency Measures to Deal with the Growing AIDS Epidemic 1
(1985) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review), and by calling its
victims "lepers," Thomas, The New Untouchables, TIME, Sept. 23, 1985, at 24. See
also LIFE, July 1985, at coverpage ("Now No One is Safe from AIDS").
3 This stigma is evidenced by the unprecedented attention that the media recently
has given to AIDS. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 2, at 18; Thomas, supra note 2, at 24.
4 N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1985, at A15, col. 4 (quoting Dr. James 0. Mason, Director, Centers for Disease Control).
5 See N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1985, at B1l, col. 3. A New York Times/CBS poll
found that 51% of the participants believed that AIDS was one of the two or three
"most serious medical problems facing the country," although almost all of those polled
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is the fear of AIDS, rather than AIDS itself, which gnaws at the flesh
of the children.
This overwhelming fear, based primarily on misinformation and
ignorance of medical data, has created a class of people considered to be
"[tihe [n]ew [u]ntouchables." ' Many individuals who are suffering
from AIDS or an AIDS-related condition, who are related to an AIDS
patient, or who are members of high-risk groups for contracting AIDS,
experience groundless discrimination, isolation, and ostracism. 7 Such
discrimination is manifested prominently in the current controversy
concerning the decision of several local school boards to exclude from
the regular classroom children who either have been diagnosed or are
perceived as having AIDS. 8 These exclusions are unwarranted because
they are based on irrational fears. The weight of available medical evidence clearly demonstrates that AIDS is transmissible only through acts
that would not occur in the normal school setting.
This Comment argues that children facing AIDS-related discrimination are protected by several federal laws that prohibit discrimination
against disabled individuals, as well as by the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution.9 Each of these enactments prohibits school officials from segregiting or excluding an AIDSlinked child from the regular classroom."0 The discussion will proceed
claimed to be aware of the very limited number of ways in which AIDS could be
transmitted. See id.
8 Thomas, supra note 2, at 24.
For example, the New York City Commission on Human Rights received 288
reports of AIDS-related discrimination between July 1, 1984 and June 30, 1985. See
Commission on Human Rights, New York City Commission on Human Rights Gay
and Lesbian Discrimination Documentation Project (1985 update) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
8 A four-year-old child with an AIDS-related condition was barred from the
classroom in Washington Borough, New Jersey, along with her healthy nine-year-old
brother, see Thomas, supra note 2, at 25; infected triplets were excluded from the
regular public school in Dade County, Florida, see N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1985, at Al,
col. 1; a 13-year-old hemophiliac with AIDS was excluded from school in Kokomo,
Indiana, see McGrath, The AIDS Issue Hits the Schools, TIME, Sept. 9, 1985, at 61;
three children in New York City were removed from their classrooms by community
school board superintendents because of suspicions that the students' mothers' boyfriends were infected, see N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1985, at Bl, col. 4.
9 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The federal statutes to be discussed are the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796(i) (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West
1986), and the Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1454 (1982 &
Supp. III 1985). The latter statute is also known as the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act because "that was the official name of the 1975 statute which extensively
amended and expanded the EHA." Goodwin, Public School Integration of Children
with HandicapsAfter Smith v. Robinson: "Separate But Equal" Revisited?, 37 ME.
L. REV. 267, 271 n.25 (1985).
10 Future references to "AIDS-linked children" and "AIDS-related children" will
include: (1) children who have been diagnosed as having AIDS; (2) children with
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on the following assumptions: first, that the AIDS-linked children at
issue are physically capable of withstanding a normal school day; second, that such children have no unusual behavioral problems, are in
complete control of their bodily secretions, and do not have uncoverable,
oozing skin lesions; and third, that medical experts will continue to regard AIDS as posing no danger to other students in the normal classroom setting.
I.

MEDICAL BACKGROUND OF

AIDS

AIDS is a physical disorder that destroys the body's ability to fight
certain infectious diseases." The virus believed to be responsible for
causing AIDS is human T-lymphotropic virus type-III, known as
HTLV-III. 2 Current reports estimate that of the 1.5 million people
thought to be infected with the HTLV-III virus, at least fifty percent
will eventually develop AIDS. 3 Other conditions, collectively referred
to as AIDS-related complex (ARC), are also caused by infection from
the HTLV-III virus but do not necessarily result in AIDS. Some individuals with ARC will eventually develop opportunistic infections that
the national Centers for Disease Control (CDC) defines as AIDS and
will be classified as AIDS patients. 4 There is no cure for AIDS and no
AIDS-related conditions, see infra text accompanying note 14; (3) children who have
tested positively for the HTLV-III virus, the virus associated with the disease, but who
show no symptoms of AIDS and may never contract it; and 4) children who are in a
high-risk group or who have family members in a high-risk group for contracting
AIDS. Because all of these children face similar forms of discrimination, and because
medical evidence indicates that none of these children can transmit AIDS in the normal
school setting, this Comment generally will not distinguish among them for purposes of
discussing their legal options. In certain sections of this Comment, however, it may be
necessary to distinguish between children diagnosed as having AIDS and children
merely perceived as having AIDS.
"I See NEW YORK CITY DEP'T OF HEALTH, AIDS: A SPECIAL REPORT ON AcQUIRED IMMUNODEFICIENCY SYNDROME 1, 3 (Oct. 1985) [hereinafter AIDS: A SPECIAL REPORT]. An AIDS patient is susceptible to certain opportunistic infections such
as Kaposi's sarcoma, a type of cancer; pneumocystic carinii pneumonia; and certain
fungal infections. See Indiana State Bd. of Health, Guidelines for Children with
AIDS/ARC Attending School 1 (July 1985) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review); AIDS: A SPECIAL REPORT, supra, at 3.
12 See New York City Dep't of Health, Aids: New York City Update, 4 CITY
HEALTH INFORMATION 1, 2 (July 24-31, 1985) [hereinafter AIDS: New York City
Update]. The HTLV-III virus is also known as LAV, Lymphocyte Associated Virus,
referring to the name that French scientists assigned to the virus.
"SSee Wallis, You Haven't Heard Anything Yet, TIME, Feb. 16, 1987, at 54; See
also Smilgis, The Big Chill: Fear of AIDS, TIME, Feb. 16, 1987, at 50,51 (more than
90% of those thought to be infected with the AIDS virus do not know that they are
carriers; additionally, the incubation period for the virus may be as long as 10 years).
Most statistics used in this Comment represent current figures at the time the
piece went to press; however statistics constantly are being updated.
"I See AIDS: New York City Update, supra note 12, at 2.
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preventive vaccine. Government experts predict that a vaccine or therapy to limit the spread of the disease will not be available before
1990." The only present possibility for treatment "is to treat intensively each infection as it arises and when that particular infection has
been eradicated, return the patient to the milieu in which he lives."'"
In 1981, AIDS was first identified under the name by which it is
presently known.'" Since that time, more than 30,000 cases resulting in
more than 15,000 deaths have been reported nationwide.'" More than
200 cases of juvenile AIDS have been diagnosed, 19 and it is reported
that there is a sixty-nine percent mortality rate for children.20 The two
groups at highest risk for contracting AIDS are homosexual or bisexual
men, and male or female intravenous drug users. Together, these
groups account for approximately ninety-three percent of AIDS cases
in the United States.2 ' Other risk groups include sexual partners of
individuals at risk for AIDS, infants born to parents at risk for AIDS,
and people who received transfusions of blood or blood products prior
to the development of the HTLV-III antibody test now used to assure
that all blood donated for use is free from the HTLV-III virus.2 2 The
majority of children with AIDS received the disease from their infected
mothers, either during pregnancy or during the birth process.2 3 Blood
transfusions administered before the use of the HTLV-III antibody test
'5See N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1985, at C1, col. 6.
16

Johnson, Editorial, 52 MEDICO-LEGAL J. 3 (1984).

17

See Centers for Disease Control, Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syn-

drome (AIDS)--United States, 32

MORBIDITY

& MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 688

(1984).
11 See Wallis, supra note 13, at 54.
19

See CENTER FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASES,

CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL,

ACQUIRED IMMUNODEFICIENCY SYNDROME (AIDS) WEEKLY SURVEILLANCE REPORT
- UNITED STATES AIDS ACTIVITY 1 (Sept. 16, 1985) [hereinafter WEEKLY SURVEIL-

LANCE REPORT]; N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1985, at
20

A19, col. 1.

See Washington Post, May 10, 1985, at A13, col. 1.

19, at 2.
See AIDS: New York City Update, supra note 12, at 3. The HTLV-III antibody test can determine whether a person has developed antibodies to the virus, indicating probable exposure to HTLV-III. A positive reaction to the test indicates that the
individual may be immune to the infection after having conquered it, may be carrying
the infection but showing no symptoms, or may be diagnosed as an AIDS victim. This
test is not an adequate predictor of AIDS, especially since AIDS will develop in only a
small minority of persons infected with the HTLV-III virus. See AIDS: A SPECIAL
REPORT, supra note 11, at 14-17.
2 The mothers of children infected in utero with HTLV-III are generally women
with a history of intravenous drug use or women who have had sexual partners who
were either intravenous drug users or bisexual men. See AIDS: New York City Update,
supra note 12, at 3. Ingestion of an infected mother's breast milk also has been cited as
a possible source of infection. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1985, at B3, col. I (offering
answers from medical authorities to questions concerning transmission of the AIDS
virus).
21

22

See WEEKLY SURVEILLANCE REPORT, supra note
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have also caused AIDS in a number of juvenile victims.2 4 In addition,
children, like adults, may acquire the disease through use of intravenous drugs or sexual contact with an infected partner.
Thus, AIDS has been transmitted in three ways: through sexual
contact, through injection of a substantial amount of infected blood directly into an individual's body, and through infection from mother to
child in utero or during the birth process.25 Although the HTLV-III
virus has been detected in saliva and tears, there are no documented
cases of AIDS resulting from transmission by these bodily fluids.2 6
Health experts contend that "transmission through ordinary social contact is virtually impossible. '27 None of the identified AIDS cases in the
United States is known to have been transmitted through casual contact
between individuals." AIDS is not spread by any airborne method,
such as coughing or sneezing, nor is it transmitted by sharing food,
water, or eating utensils with infected persons.2 9
In studies of children afflicted with AIDS who were monitored for
periods of a few months to five years, no other member of any child's
family acquired either AIDS or the HTLV-III virus as a result of contact with the infected child."0 These children shared drinking cups,
beds, and even toothbrushes with their siblings; nevertheless, the siblings remained healthy." In fact, some families took no special precau24 Blood banks and hospitals began using the HTLV-III antibody test in March
1985. See Centers for Disease Control, Education and Foster Care of Children Infected with Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type IllLymphadenopathy-Associated Virus, 34 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 517, 518 (August 30, 1985) [hereinafter Education and Foster Care of Children]; Washington Post, May 10, 1985, at
A13, col. 1.
25 It should be noted that "[s]trong evidence indicates that large quantities of such
infected materials as blood or sexual discharges must enter the body to spread the disease." N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1985, at B3, col. 1.
26 See Education and Foster Care of Children, supra note 24, at 518. The presence of HTLV-III is extremely rare in saliva and there is no evidence that the virus is
transmitted through saliva. See District 27 Community Bd. v. Board of Educ., 130
Misc. 2d 398, 407 & n.3, 502 N.Y.S.2d 325, 331-32 & n.9 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (citation
omitted); N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1985, at B3, col. 1. HTLV-III is not present in perspiration, urine, or feces. See id.
217 N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1985, at A19, col. 1 (discussing recommendations of the
American Academy of Pediatrics).
26 See Education and Foster Care of Children, supra note 24, at 519.
29 See N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1985, at B3, col. 1.

30 See

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, STATE OF NEW YORK, PUBLIC HEALTH SE-

RIES 85-92, GUIDELINES FOR THE EDUCATION AND DAY-CARE OF CHILDREN INFECTED WITH HUMAN T-LYMPHOTROPIC VIRUS TYPE III/LYMPHOADENOPATHYASSOCIATED VIRUS (HTLV III/LAV) 2 (September 4, 1985); N.Y. Times, Sept. 20,

1985, at A15, col. 4.
31 See N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1985, at A15, col. 4. "[N]ot one family member of
the more than 13,000 victims reported to the Federal Centers for Disease Control has
become infected with the virus, despite what in many cases was [sic] years of close
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tions against contracting the disease because it was not known for many
years that a child in the family had AIDS. Even so, there is no evidence
that the healthy siblings of these children were infected with the
HTLV-III virus as a result of contact with their infected family members. It seems clear, then, that while a theoretical risk of transmission
from casual contact remains a remote possibility, such transmission is
virtually impossible as a practical matter. Indeed, the director of the
CDC has stated that the risk of contracting AIDS from a child in the
classroom is comparable to that of "'being struck by lightning when
you walk out the front door in the morning,'" and the risk of getting
the disease as a result of the casual contact that occurs in a school setting is " 'much less than the chance of the boiler that heats the building
blowing up.' -82
II.

FEDERAL ENACTMENTS THAT PROHIBIT DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST AIDS-LINKED CHILDREN

Because the risk of contagion by the type of casual contact that
occurs in a school setting is "nil or infinitesimally small," 3 any attempt
to exclude or segregate AIDS-linked children from the regular classroom is unwarranted and therefore constitutes unlawful discrimination.
Although the AIDS "epidemic" 3 4 raises a reasonable health concern in
many circumstances, the fear some parents and school administrators
have displayed with regard to the presence of AIDS-linked children in
regular schools is unfounded. 5
contact with an infected person .

. . ."

N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1985, at B3, col. 1.

11 N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1985, at B11, col. 3 (quoting Dr. James 0. Mason,
Director, CDC). Dr. Pauline Thomas, a pediatric AIDS specialist with two young
children, was asked under oath whether she would allow one of her children to be
given the HTLV-III antibody test if the child had been bitten by a known AIDS
patient. The doctor quickly and unequivocally replied that she would not. See N.Y.
Times, Sept. 23, 1985, at B5, col. 1; see also N.Y. Times, June 20, 1986, at A14, col. 1
(reporting that the American Medical Association recommends that AIDS-linked children not be barred from public schools).
a Boston Globe, May 12, 1985, at 29, col. 5, 36, col. 3.
84 Federal authorities have explained that AIDS is considered an epidemic because of the unexpected increase in its incidence, not because it is easily transmissible.
See N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1985, at B3, col. 1.
" Parental concern for the health and well-being of schoolchildren is certainly
understandable. Such fear, however, should not be permitted to interfere with proper
decisionmaking. As one New York court has stated:
Although this court certainly empathizes with the fears and concerns of
parents for the health and welfare of their children within the school setting, at the same time it is duty bound to objectively evaluate the issue of
automatic exclusion according to the evidence gathered and not be influenced by unsubstantiated fears of catastrophe.
District 27 Community School Bd. v. Board of Educ., 130 Misc. 2d 398, 413, 502
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In other contexts, such fear has failed to justify the exclusion of
AIDS victims. In LaRocca v. Dahlsheim,6 for example, healthy prisoners sought to expel infected prisoners from the same correctional facility. After reviewing the medical data, the court held that removing
AIDS-linked prisoners from the facility was wholly unwarranted. 7 Because the conditions of interaction among students in the classroom are
much less confined than those among incarcerated prisoners, the result
in LaRocca clearly argues against segregating AIDS-linked children
from the regular schoolroom.
Nevertheless, several school administrators and school boards have
attempted to bar AIDS-related children from unrestricted learning in
their normal classrooms." One such resolution passed by a community
school board in Queens, New York, stated that because
the health and safety of the pupil/staff population of the
thirty-five schools under its jurisdiction would be endangered
by a case, contact or carrier, or suspected case, contact or
carrier of AIDS . . . said child(ren) shall not be admitted to
any school register and/or shall be removed from any school
register 9
in that school district. This resolution would bar from the classroom
any child diagnosed as having AIDS; any child who has tested positively for the HTLV-III virus; any child with ARC; and any child who
has a relative with AIDS, is a member of a high-risk group for contracting AIDS, or has a friend or relative who is a member of such a
40
high-risk group.
The federal enactments that could protect AIDS-linked children
from these and other discriminatory regulations are section 504 of the
N.Y.2d 325, 335 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (citation omitted); see also Note, The Constitutional
Rights of AIDS Carriers,99 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1291 (1986) ("Although even the
most rational parents may feel uneasy knowing their children attend school with an
AIDS carrier, it is the real, not the perceived, health hazard that courts must
consider.").
38 120 Misc. 2d 697, 467 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup. Ct. 1983).
37 Id. at 709-10, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 310-11.
38 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
Community School Board-District 27, City of New York, Addendum to the
Community School Board 27 Open Meeting Agenda of August 22, 1985 (on file with
the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) [hereinafter Addendum]. The school
board asserted that "a conservative attitude toward the care and teaching of our children is the most sensible and responsible approach." Id.
0 Community school boards in districts 27 and 29 voted to prohibit any child
with AIDS or any child perceived as having AIDS from attending their normal schools.
Although the school boards sought an injunction to prevent such children from attending regular classes, see N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1985, at B1, col 2, B5, col. 1, a state trial
court denied their request. See District 27 Community School Bd. v. Board of Educ.,
130 Misc. 2d 398, 422-23, 502 N.Y.S.2d 325, 341-42 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
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Rehabilitation Act of 1973,' which prohibits discrimination against the
disabled; the Education of the Handicapped Act,42 which evidences a
strong federal policy favoring full education for the handicapped; and
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.43 Each will
be discussed in turn.44
A.

The Rehabilitation Act of 1973

The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [the Act] provides a legal basis on
which AIDS-linked children may assert a right to a regular, nonsegregated education. Section 504 of the Act mandates: "No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States . . . shall, solely by

reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance. ' 45 Since public schools in
46
all states but one utilize federal funds for their educational programs,
federal law prohibits these schools from discriminating against handicapped schoolchildren.
The Rehabilitation Act defines a "handicapped individual" as
"any person who (i) has a physical . . . impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a
record of such impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment." 47 The Act's coverage of "otherwise qualified handicapped
individual[s]" means that a person suffering from a disability may not
be treated differently from a nondisabled individual. Furthermore, the
Act includes within its scope persons who presently have no incapacity
at all, or who have a disability that does not substantially limit major
life activities, but who are merely perceived as having an impairment
that substantially limits such activities. 48 The Act's language and the
41

29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).

42 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-54 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
41 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
44 This Comment does not treat as distinguishable children

diagnosed as having
AIDS and children merely perceived as having AIDS. These two groups of children
are indistinguishable with respect to the issues presented herein because it is assumed
that no child in either group can transmit AIDS in the typical school setting.
45 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
4' All states except New Mexico receive federal financial assistance for education.
See Comment, Enforcing the Right to an "Appropriate" Education: The Education
for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1103, 1105 n.18
(1979).
47 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982). "Major life activities" include functions such as
caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, breathing,
learning, and working. 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(j)(2)(ii) (1985).
4 See 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(g)(2)(iv) (1985).
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case law interpreting it indicate that individuals with contagious diseases are included within the Act's coverage. Although AIDS cannot be
transmitted by casual contact, it is among the contagious diseases addressed by the Act. In fact, the Act prohibits public schools that receive
federal aid from discriminating not only against children who have
been diagnosed as having AIDS, but also against children who are perceived by the public or by school administrators as being AIDS victims.
Children diagnosed as having AIDS fall within the purview of the
Act. An AIDS patient does indeed suffer from a "physical. . . impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life
activities."' 49 The regulations promulgated under the Act define "physical or mental impairment" to mean, among other things, any physiological condition affecting the lymphatic system. 0 Because AIDS interferes with the body's ability to produce certain leucocytes, which
comprise part of the lymphatic system, children diagnosed as having
AIDS have a "physical impairment" within the scope of the Act.5
AIDS-linked children who have not been diagnosed as having the dis29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982).
:0 See 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(2)(i)(A) (1986).
, See 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(j)(2)(iii) (1985); see also District 27 Community School
Bd. v. Board of Educ., 130 Misc. 2d 398, 415, 502 N.Y.S.2d 325, 336 (Sup. Ct. 1986)
(discussing application of the Act to children with AIDS).
For a thorough discussion of the language of the Act and a survey of corresponding state statutes in the context of employment discrimination, see Leonard, Employment DiscriminationAgainst Personswith AIDS, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 681, 689-96
(1985). Leonard asserts that AIDS is an "impairment" within the meaning of the Act:
the disease "impairs the 'essential life function' of the immune system, limiting the
ability of the body to fight infection and preserve health, and causing physical debilitation that affects strength and endurance." Id. at 696.
Leonard also discusses several state statutes that specifically classify a disease or
illness as a handicap in the same manner that a genetic defect or an injury would be
considered a handicap. Id. at 692, 695. An illustration of this sort of classification
appears in New York state law, which defines "physically handicapped children" as
those "who are handicapped by reason of a defect or disability, whether congenital or
acquired by injury, or disease, or who are suffering from long-term disease." N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 2581 (McKinney 1985).
In fact, the majority of states classify AIDS as a handicap, in contrast to the Department of Justice, which permits an employer to refuse to hire persons with AIDS if
the employer cites "'fear of contagion, whether reasonable or not.'" N.Y. Times, Sept.
17, 1986, at A20, col. 1. A Justice Department memorandum regarding the application
of § 504 to AIDS-linked persons concludes that "an individual's (real or perceived)
ability to transmit the disease to others is not a handicap within the meaning of the
statute" and, therefore, that "discrimination on this basis does not fall within section
504." OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, APPLICATION OF SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT TO PERSONS WITH AIDS, AIDS-RELATED
COMPLEX, OR INFECTION WITH THE AIDS VIRUS 1 (1986) (on file with the University of PennsylvaniaLaw Review). If the memorandum's conclusion is correct, an employer, without violating the Act, may fire an employee solely out of fear that the
individual may transmit AIDS, regardless of whether any factual support exists for
such a belief.
'1
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ease are protected by the Act as well, because they are "regarded as
having . . . an impairment."5 2

The underlying policy of the Act is to ensure that individuals with
actual or perceived disabilities will not be prevented from performing
activities that they are capable of performing, simply because of discriminatory views that "unfairly ignore their individual qualifications
'5 3
and [are] based on prejudicial beliefs about [that] class [of persons].
The spirit of the Act certainly would be violated if AIDS-linked children were summarily barred from the regular classroom, rather than
judged on the basis of their present ability of an AIDS-linked child to
benefit from a normal education.
Furthermore, section 84.34 of the regulations promulgated under
the Act provides that a recipient of federal financial assistance should
offer education to a handicapped person in the least restrictive setting
possible. 5 ' In other words, the state should provide an education to
handicagped persons in a setting with nonhandicapped individuals
whenever feasible. 55 In accordance with this principle, AIDS-linked
children must not be excluded from receiving an education in the same
classroom with their peers. Indeed, to exclude these children from a
state program that is normally available to all children is, in effect, a
quarantine. An executive order concerning quarantines identifies certain easily communicable diseases, among which neither AIDS nor any
of the opportunistic diseases associated with AIDS appears.5 6 Clearly,
AIDS does not pose the kind of threat that warrants quarantine from
57
society.
Section 504 of the Act imposes a rebuttable presumption of illegality upon any defendant who bars handicapped children from their reg52

29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982).

" Leonard, supra note 51, at 696.
" See 45 C.F.R. § 84.34 (1985).
11 The same philosophy appears in the Education of the Handicapped Act, 20
U.S.C. §§ 1400-1454 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), and is known as "mainstreaming."
The Education of the Handicapped Act will be discussed subsequently, see infra text
accompanying notes 92-110.
" See Exec. Order No. 12,452, 48 Fed. Reg. 56, 927 reprinted in 42 U.S.C. §
264 (Supp. 111 1985). The list of "quarantinable communicable diseases" includes
"Cholera or suspected Cholera, Diphtheria, infectious Tuberculosis, Plague, suspected
Smallpox, Yellow Fever, and suspected Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers." Id. Included in the
list of opportunistic diseases that the CDC considers indicative of the presence of AIDS
are: disseminated histoplasmosis, isosporiasis, bronchial or pulmonary condiasis, nonHodgkin's lymphoma of high-grade pathologic type and of B-cell of unknown immunologic phenotype, Kaposi's sarcoma, and, unless tests for the HTLV-III virus are negative, chronic lymphoid interstitial pneumonitis. Indiana St. Bd. of Health, supra note
11, at 7.
" See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
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ular classrooms." Since the real or perceived handicaps of AIDS-linked
children are totally unrelated to their potential for successful performance in school, a segregated AIDS child needs only to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination.59 At that point, the school board that separated the child would have to present evidence to rebut the claim of
discrimination. If it could not, it would then have to integrate the
child.60
Existing case law offers limited guidance regarding the rights of
AIDS victims under the Act.6 1 To analyze properly the issues involved
58 See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see also New York Ass'n for
Retarded Children v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644, 649 (2d Cir. 1979) (construing § 504 of the
Act as creating a rebuttable presumption).
69 In order to present a prima facie case of discrimination, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the defendant, by having received federal financial assistance, is subject to the mandates of § 504, that the plaintiff is handicapped, and that the defendant
has segregated the plaintiff from the normal classroom. See Goodwin, supra note 9, at
291. 10 See Carey, 612 F.2d at 649; see also Goodwin, supra note 9, at 289. Goodwin
suggests that § 504 allows the plaintiff an easier case than does the Education of the
Handicapped Act, because the latter legislation requires that the AIDS child "prove
both the existence of segregation and the feasibility of education in an integrated setting." Id.
61 A Lexis search on January 10, 1987 using the search command "acquired immunodeficiency syndrome or acquired immune deficiency syndrome" revealed 27 cases
in both federal and state courts: Fenton v. City of Philadelphia, Civ. Action No. 863529 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file) (refusing to dismiss § 1983 claim of sex crimes when arrestee accused by police officers of having
AIDS); American Council of Life Ins. v. District of Columbia, 645 F. Supp. 84
(D.D.C. 1986) (upholding ordinance prohibiting health, life, and disability insurers
from discriminating on the basis of AIDS testing); Torres v. City of Philadelphia Police
Dep't Sex Crimes Unit, Civ. Action Nos. 86-3826, 86-3827 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 1986)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file) (dismissing, for lack of specificity, claim that
police officers intimidated arrestee by telling him he might have AIDS); Broadway
Books v. Roberts, 642 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (sustaining an'ordinance regulating adult theaters, inter alia, on substantial governmental interest in preventing
AIDS); Storms v. Department of Correctional Servs., No. 85 Civ. 7186 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
18, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file) (dismissing due process claim of prison
legal assistant representing prisoners with AIDS); Foy v. Owens, No. 85-6909 (E.D.
Pa. Mar. 19, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file) (dismissing prisoner's claims
that potential AIDS carriers should be quarantined); Powell v. Department of Corrections, Nos. 85-C-820-C, 85-C-816-B (N.D. Okla. Feb. 20, 1986) (dismissing § 1983
claim of prisoner who tested positively for exposure to AIDS and thus was segregated);
First-Penn Pac. Life Ins. Co. v. Mock, No. 85 C 6432 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 10, 1986)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file) (settling estate of possible AIDS victim); Georgia
ex rel. Slaton v. Fleck & Assocs., 622 F. Supp. 256 (D. Ga. 1985) (refusing removal to
federal court of nuisance prosecution of nightclub allegedly frequented by AIDS carriers); Baker v. Wade, 106 F.R.D. 526 (N.D. Tex.), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3337 (1986) (denying motion to reopen trial involving
constitutional attack on sodomy statute because of new evidence concerning AIDS);
Cordero v. Coughlin, 607 F. Supp. 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (dismissing constitutional claims
of AIDS prisoners segregated from general prison population); Institut Pasteur v.
United States, 10 Cl. Ct. 304 (1986) (dismissing contract action concerning AIDSrelated patent); Flood v. Wyeth Laboratories, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1272, 228 Cal. Rptr.
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in the case of a child diagnosed as having AIDS, it is helpful to analogize to cases involving other contagious diseases in which similar issues
have arisen. The application of section 504 in two recent cases, one
dealing with tuberculosis and the other with hepatitis B, strongly supports the argument that the Act also protects AIDS patients.
In Arline v. School Board, 2 the Eleventh Circuit interpreted section 504 to include coverage of a contagious disease. It held that tuberculosis constitutes a handicap within the meaning of the Rehabilitation
Act. In this case, a public school teacher had been dismissed after contracting tuberculosis, an illness transmitted much more easily than
AIDS and, unlike AIDS, certainly transmissible in a casual setting.
The court stated that the language of the Act and its implementing
regulations "in every respect supports a conclusion that persons with
contagious diseases are within the coverage of section 5042"63 The court
700 (1986) (distinguishing proposed legislative grant of immunity to developers of
AIDS vaccine from denial of immunity to manufacturer of DPT vaccine); Hyland
Therapeutics v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. App. 3d 509, 220 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1985)
(refusing to hold plasma manufacturers strictly liable for AIDS-related death caused by
contaminated blood product); Klein v. Panic, Civ. Action No. 8721 (Del. Ch. Nov. 20,
1986) (LEXIS, States library, Omni file) (denying plaintiff's application for temporary
restraining order in stock option suit of AIDS research company); South Fla. Blood
Serv. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (quashing on privacy
grounds subpoena to blood bank by AIDS victim requesting names of blood donors); In
re Commitment of B.S., No. A-4365-85T5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 5, 1986)
(LEXIS, States library, Omni file) (authorizing commitment of mentally ill woman
who incidentally had AIDS); Board of Educ. v. Cooperman, 209 N.J. Super. 174, 507
A.2d 253 (1986) (reversing education commissioner's order requiring school districts to
admit children with AIDS pending holding of administrative hearing on the order);
New Jersey v. Muessig, 198 N.J. Super. 197, 486 A.2d 924 (App. Div.), cert. denied,
101 N.J. 234, 501 A.2d 912 (1985) (noting that state prison system is equipped to
handle AIDS); Albany County Dep't of Social Serv. ex rel. Sousis v. Seeberger, 112
A.D.2d 674, 492 N.Y.S.2d 182 (1985) (rejecting claim that blood test in paternity suit
would increase prison guard's susceptibility to AIDS); Doe v. Coughlin, 132 Misc. 2d
709,
505
N.Y.S.2d 534 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (denying conjugal visit to prisoner with AIDS); District
27 Community School Bd. v. Board of Educ., 130 Misc. 2d 398, 502 N.Y.S.2d 325
(Sup. Ct. 1986) (holding that the Rehabilitation Act and the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment prevent automatic exclusion of children with AIDS from
New York City schools); City of New York v. New Saint Mark's Baths, 130 Misc. 2d
911, 497 N.Y.S.2d 979 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (granting preliminary injunction to close bathhouses pursuant to state regulation aimed at preventing AIDS); Menaldino ex rel.
Smyth v. Rawson, 127 Misc. 2d 931, 487 N.Y.S.2d 685 (Fam. Ct. 1985) (rejecting
claim that blood test in paternity suit would increase prison guard's susceptibility to
AIDS); LaRocca v. Dahlsheim, 120 Misc. 2d 697, 467 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup. Ct. 1983)
(rejecting challenge to prison policies concerning AIDS); Feigly v. Jeffes, 501 A.2d 385
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986) (dismissing for deficient service of process prisoner's claim that
prison food handlers should be screened for AIDS); Pawlisch v. Barry, 126 Wis. 2d
162, 376 N.W.2d 368 (Ct. App. 1985) (sustaining removal of board of health member
who disagreed with county executive over AIDS policy).
62 772 F.2d 759 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S.Ct. 1633 (1986).
63 Id. at 764.
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concluded that "coverage . . clearly . . . promote[s] Congress's intent
to reduce instances of unthinking and unnecessary discrimination
against those who are the focus of the statute's concern .. ."64 Thus,
the teacher was ordered reinstated. Clearly, AIDS patients should receive the same or greater consideration, because AIDS poses less of a
threat of infection than does tuberculosis. As in Arline, the rationale of
any school board choosing to segregate an AIDS child would not "reflect a well-informed judgment grounded in a careful and open-minded
weighing of the risks and alternatives"; rather, the board simply would
be yielding to "reflexive reactions grounded in ignorance or capitulat[ing] to public prejudice."6 5
New York State Associationfor Retarded Childrenv. Carey66 also
suggests that children diagnosed as having AIDS are protected by the
Act. In Carey, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit overturned
a decision by school administrators to segregate from their regular
classrooms certain mentally retarded children infected with hepatitis B.
The court based its decision solely on section 504's mandate that handicapped children should not be excluded from regular public school sessions simply because of their handicap.6 7
AIDS is often compared with hepatitis B.68 Like AIDS, hepatitis
B has no known cure and can be transmitted through sexual contact,
exposure to contaminated blood or blood products, or infection in utero
from a mother to her offspring.69 Hepatitis B, however, is "both har•dier and more infectious than HTLV-III/LAV, 7 0 and some experts
believe hepatitis B, unlike AIDS, may be transmitted through infected
saliva.7 1 The CDC has stated that the hepatitis B mode of transmission
approximates the worst possible case scenario for the spread of AIDS,
because the risk of acquiring hepatitis B is "far in excess" of the risk of
contracting AIDS. 2 The CDC maintains that if the precautions folId.
65 Id. at 765.
64

66 612 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1979).
17 See id. at
8 See, e.g.,

649.
Centers for Disease Control, Summary: Recommendations for

Preventing Transmission of Infection with Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type 1111
Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus in the Workplace, 34 MORBIDrrY & MORTALITY
WEEKLY REP. 681 (1985) [hereinafter Summary]; Foege, The National Pattern of
Aids, in THE AIDS EPIDEMIC 15 (K. Cahill ed. 1983).
69 See Summary, supra note 68, at 682-83; see also D. ROTHMAN & S. ROTHMAN, THE WILLOWBROOK WARs 269 (1984) (indicating that contact with blood and
other bodily fluids is the primary means of contracting hepatitis).
10 Summary, supra note 68, at 681.
71 See New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 466 F. Supp. 487,
489 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), affd, 612 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1979).
72 Summary, supra note 68, at 683.
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lowed to prevent the spread of hepatitis B are used to prevent transmission of AIDS, exposure to an AIDS patient will pose no danger of
infection to a healthy individual." Carey presents an excellent model
for analysis of the issues involving AIDS children, the only difference
being that hepatitis B is transmitted far more easily than AIDS.
Carey involved the actions of school administrators who yielded to
pressure from parents of healthy children and the fear of adverse publicity. The school board had devised a plan under which some known
carriers of hepatitis B would be segregated within the school from their
healthy peers, thereby disrupting the normal course of the segregated
children's education.7 4 The district court stated that the potential health
risk involved in exposing these children to uninfected classmates was
not clearly demonstrated to be "significant":15 the "medical evidence
upon which the proposal is based is sparse and fails to demonstrate any
causal relationship between the classroom setting and transmission of
the virus."' 76 Indeed, segregating the children was "an unwarranted and
unnecessarily restrictive reaction to the purely theoretical risk of transmission that the [School] Board has shown." 77 The court also discussed
the important role schooling plays in socializing handicapped children:
A child's chance in this society is through the educational
process. A major goal of the educational process is the socialization process that takes place in the regular classroom,
with the resulting capability to interact in a social way with
one's peers. It is therefore imperative that every child receive
an education with his or her peers insofar as it is at all possible....
. . . [P]lacement of children in abnormal environments
outside of peer situations imposes additional psychological
73 See id. at 681. The New York City Board of Health, for example, has suggested precautions to guard against the theoretical risk of AIDS transmission in the
school setting:
If blood comes into contact with skin, as occurs when a teacher cares
for a child with a bloody nose, the skin should be washed with soap and
water. As an extra precaution, the skin may be wiped with an alcohol
swab.
Surfaces soiled with blood should be cleaned with soap and water
followed by disinfection with rubbing alcohol or household bleach.
Bites should be washed with soap and water and then wiped with an
alcohol swab. In the event of a serious bite, the principal should be notified so that any further medical treatment that is necessary may be sought.
AIDS: A SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 21.
74 See Carey, 466 F. Supp. at 492.
75
76
7

See id. at 500.
Id. at 499.
Id. at 500.
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and emotional handicaps upon children which, added to
their existing handicaps causes them greater difficulties in
future life. A child has to learn to interact in a social way
with its [sic] peers and the denial of this opportunity during
his minor years imposes added lifetime burdens upon a
handicapped individual. 8
The district court held that the segregation plan violated section
504 of the Act.7 9 Under the Act, the schools were obligated to provide
education for the infected children in the least restrictive environment
possible.8" The court emphasized that the defendant could not demonstrate even a single instance of transmission of hepatitis B within the
school environment;8 the school board's "showing of a purely theoretical risk of spread of hepatitis B predicated upon a philosophical concept
of causation is insufficient to offset the weighty countervailing educational needs of the affected children. No substantial justification for the
proposed discrimination has been demonstrated, which absence compels
[the] conclusion" that segregating carriers of the disease violates section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act.82
Agreeing that the school board had failed to make a "substantial
showing" that segregation was warranted, 83 the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the school
board was unable to demonstrate any more than a "remote possibility"
that the disease could be transmitted in the normal classroom setting.
The merely theoretical possibility of contagion did not pose the "significant risk" necessary to justify segregation.8 4
There are striking parallels between the situation in Carey and
that involving AIDS-linked children. If a segregation plan were implemented for AIDS-linked children, school administrators would be
yielding to public pressure rather than considering medical facts, just as
the school board in Carey succumbed to the desires of the parents of
healthy children. As the Carey courts did not echo the public's fears, no
718Id. at 496-97 (quoting Hairston v. Drosick, 423 F. Supp. 180, 183 (S.D.W.
Va. 1976)).
" See id. at 502.
:0 See id. at 503.

1 See id.
Id. The court held that the segregation plan also violated the Education of the
Handicapped Act, the equal protection clause of the Constitution, and several other
laws not directly related to the issues under discussion here. The court of appeals af-"
firmed the district court's decision solely on the ground that segregating the carriers
violated the Rehabilitation Act. See New York Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey,
612 F.2d 644, 649 (2d Cir. 1979).
88 See Carey, 612 F.2d at 650.
84 Id. at 651.
82
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court should blindly accept the public's opinion regarding AIDS. Carey
stands for the proposition that the unrestricted education of a child is
far more important than a "purely theoretical risk of transmission" of
disease in the classroom setting.
Recently, a New York State trial court adopted the reasoning of
Carey when it held that automatic exclusion of juvenile AIDS victims
from the classroom violated their rights under the Act. In District 27
Community School Board v. Board of Education, " two local school
boards sought an injunction to prohibit the New York City Board of
Education from admitting a child thought to have AIDS to any public
school in the city. The court refused to issue injunctive relief, partly on
the ground that providing the relief sought would violate the mandates
of the Act. 86 Because the effect of the AIDS virus on the lymphatic
system qualified its victims as persons with a physical impairment, as
defined in the regulations promulgated under the Act,8 both AIDS victims and, presumably, those perceived as having AIDS were entitled to
the Act's protection."8 The court relied in part on the Second Circuit's
decision in Carey; in fact, because "several medical experts described
the hepatitis B virus as being 'far more contagious' than the AIDS virus, the failure of proof in [the instant case was] even greater than...
in Carey . . . .", The petitioners were unable to establish anything
beyond a "remote theoretical possibility" of transmitting the AIDS virus in a school setting." Thus, the Board of Education could not be
enjoined from admitting AIDS-linked children to their normal
classrooms.
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 protects AIDSlinked children from discrimination. Another federal act, the Education
of the Handicapped Act, complements the Rehabilitation Act and provides similar protection.9 1
8 130 Misc. 398, 502 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
s See id. at 413-15, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 335-36. The court also held that the relief
sought would deny to the child in question the equal protection of the laws. See id. at
416-17, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 337-38.
87 See id. at 414, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 335; see supra notes 50-52 and accompanying
text.

81 See District 27, 130 Misc. 2d at 414, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 336.
19 Id. at 415, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 337.
90 Id.

"I The Supreme Court held in Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984), that a
handicapped child who asserted the right to have the state provide a special education
could not base his claim on the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 or the equal protection
clause. The Court stated that the child's only remedy was founded on the Education of
the Handicapped Act. Smith did not address the issue of a child who desired to be
mainstreamed but rather was limited to a situation in which a child's choice was between two or more nonmainstreamed educational placements. For a discussion concern-
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B.

The Education of the Handicapped Act

The Education of the Handicapped Act92 (EHA) was enacted to
"meet the educational needs of handicapped children in order to assure
equal protection of the law."'9 3 The EHA requires state and local
school boards receiving federal funding to establish and maintain "a
policy that assures all handicapped children the right to a free appropriate public education," 4 and provide a "full educational opportunity
to all handicapped children."9 Furthermore, Congress wrote into the
law a strong preference for mainstreaming, requiring the states to
establish
procedures to assure that to the maximum extent appropriate, handicapped children . . . are educated with children
who are not handicapped, and that special classes, separate
schooling, or other removal of handicapped children from the
regular educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the handicap is such that education in regular classes . . .cannot be achieved satisfactorily.9"
The statute defines handicapped children as those who are "mentally
retarded, hard of hearing, deaf, speech or language impaired, . . . or
other health impaired children. ' 97 Under the regulations that implement the statute, "other health impaired children" include those who
suffer from "limited strength [or] vitality . . . due to chronic or acute
health problems."9 8
Like the Rehabilitation Act, the EHA appears to include AIDSlinked children within its coverage.9 9 AIDS patients suffer from a
ing the dichotomy between those sections of the Education of the Handicapped Act
dealing with mainstreaming versus those addressing specialized education, see Goodwin, supra note 9, at 279-84; see also Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983) (holding that the free appropriate education
and integrated placement requirements are two distinct mandates of the Education of
the Handicapped Act).
92 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1454 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
93 Id. § 1400.
94Id. § 1412(1).

95 Id. § 1412(2)(A)(i).
96 Id. § 1412(5)(B). This provision is commonly referred to as the "least restrictive environment" or "mainstreaming" section. The implementing regulations of the
EHA are grouped under the category heading, "least restrictive environment"; the statute itself does not include such language. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.132, 300.550-.556
(1986).
97 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (emphasis added).
8 34 C.F.R. § 300.5(b)(7) (1986).
9 Courts addressing the legal rights of handicapped children frequently discuss
the two statutes in conjunction with each other. See, e.g., New York State Ass'n for
Retarded Children v. Carey, 466 F. Supp. 487, 501 (stating that the proposed segrega-
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chronic health impairment that affects their strength and vitality. Their
inability to fight off infections, however, does not automatically warrant
their removal from the regular classroom setting. A decision by school
administrators to separate a child who does not require removal constitutes a prima facie violation of the EHA's mainstreaming provisions.10 0
In addition to requiring that AIDS-linked children be mainstreamed,
the EHA mandates that the state assess each disabled child individually
and place her according to her particular needs, rather than treat all
such children in a uniform manner.10 1 The procedures required under
the EHA ensure that all children reviewed will be mainstreamed "to
the maximum extent appropriate" for each child.'0 2
The relevant question under the EHA is whether the proposed
placement of an AIDS-linked child is appropriate. If it is feasible to
tion required review under the Rehabilitation Act and the EHA), affd, 612 F.2d 644
(2d Cir. 1979).
One court has suggested that the term "handicapped child" "is more narrowly
defined in the Education of the Handicapped Act than [in] the Rehabilitation Act."
District 27 Community School Bd. v. Board of Educ., 130 Misc. 2d 398, 418, 502
N.Y.S.2d 325, 339 (Sup. Ct. 1986). In frustrating petitioners' efforts to enjoin AIDSlinked children from attending regular classes, the court stated that "while a child with
AIDS could become handicapped as a result of deterioration in his or her condition, the
evidence clearly supports the determination that such children are not handicapped...
merely because they have AIDS/ARC or are infected with the HTLV-III/LAV virus." Id. at 418-19, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 339 (emphasis added).
While endorsing the result in District 27, this Comment rejects the court's proposed classification of AIDS-linked students under the EHA. AIDS and related diseases can cause those infected to have "limited strength [or] vitality," 34 C.F.R. §
300.5(b)(7) (1986), at any time. Moreover, AIDS-linked children must shoulder the
psychological burdens and stigma inflicted by association with AIDS even when they
are outwardly healthy. Thus, this Comment argues that at any given moment, AIDS
and related diseases can "adversely [affect] a child's educational performance." Id. As a
result, AIDS-linked children deserve the special services, such as counseling and tutoring, that they can obtain as a result of individualized treatment under the EHA. Although it appears to appreciate the EHA's preference for mainstreaming, the District
27 court underestimates the need of AIDS-linked children to benefit from the particularized attention that complements maximization of the normal classroom experience
under the EHA.
The EHA does not specifically address children who are merely perceived as having health problems, such as children who are not diagnosed as having AIDS but who
suffer AIDS-related discrimination. Because the statute requires that each child be individually evaluated, these children would be found completely healthy and therefore
would be mainstreamed pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
100 See Espino v. Besteiro, 520 F. Supp. 905, 911 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
101 See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). For example, New York
City has implemented procedures for reviewing schoolchildren diagnosed as having
AIDS. Each student is assessed by a panel of four people from the city's Department of
Health. The panel, which consists of a pediatrician, an educator, a social worker, and a
parent, bases its recommendations on the "physical, developmental, neurological and
behavioral (sic) condition" of each AIDS-linked child. AIDS: A SPECIAL REPORT,
supra note 11, at 20-21.
102

U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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place a child in an integrated setting, then to place the child elsewhere
violates the EHA. With respect to children diagnosed as having AIDS,
medical evidence indicates that they pose no practical danger to other
children.1 03 The remaining question is whether other students pose
such a risk to the infected child that it is necessary to remove her from
the regular classroom.
A reduced immunological ability to combat illnesses that frequently affect schoolchildren might justify the segregation of children
with AIDS. Not all AIDS victims, however, face equal risks of infection. The CDC has stated: "Assessment of the risk to the immunodepressed child is best made by the child's physician who is aware of
the child's immune status." 10 4 Thus, a child who has been judged by
her physician to be capable of attending school should not be prevented
from doing so by a school board resolution that summarily bars all
AIDS-linked children from the classroom. For infected schoolchildren
who have been deemed by their- physicians to be capable of attending
school, the benefits of learning in a classroom with nonhandicapped
peers outweigh the risks of contracting potentially harmful infections.
The stigma of being labelled as abnormal severely damages the
sense of self-worth of segregated AIDS-linked children. Restricted access to socializing and learning with peers does not "represent a full
educational opportunity for [a child] as it isolate[s] him and tend[s] to
call undue attention to his handicap.

10

5

A Texas district court has

-noted that "[flull social interaction is an important part of today's educational curriculum and is even more vital to a child

. .

.

who necessa-

rily suffers a certain degree of isolation as a result of his handicap."10
Psychologists and educators have agreed that "face-to-face contact between students"' 07 plays an essential role in a proper education; indeed,
appropriate schooling "consists of many elements, ranging from the
desk [at which the child sits] to the child who sits next to him, and
includ[es] the teacher who stands at the front of his class." 108 Without

all these elements, an education is surely incomplete. AIDS-linked chilSee supra text accompanying notes 25-32.
Education and Foster Care of Children, supra note 24, at 519. Furthermore,
the CDC has indicated that "[t]he risk of acquiring some infections ... may be reduced by prompt use of specific immune globulin following a known exposure." Id.
10 Espino v. Besteiro, 520 F. Supp. 905, 909 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (evaluating the
isolation within a regular classroom of a seven-year-old boy "medically diagnosed as a
quadriplegic and ... confined to a wheelchair," id. at 906).
103

104

106 Id.

at 913.

Crockenberg & Bryant, Socialization: The "Implicit Curriculum" of Learning Environments, 12 J. REs. DEv. EDUC. 69, 71 (1978).
107

108 Coleman,

CIAL
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ORDER 114 (F. Cordasco, M. Hillson, & H. Bullock eds. 1970).
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dren must not be required to suffer the consequences of segregation.
Educating these children in separate classrooms or allowing them to
communicate with their teachers and classmates only by telephone
clearly denies them the full benefits of a proper education.'0 9
Furthermore, if healthy children are made to believe that AIDSlinked children are somehow unfit for social interaction and therefore
must be separated from the rest, these children will learn a lesson of
fear, mistrust, and intolerance that they will carry into their adult lives.
School administrators may unconsciously impart to healthy children a
very dangerous message about those who are different and who are not
responsible for their disabling condition. After all, attitudes promoted
in the classroom merely reflect the misconceptions and stereotypes of
society as a whole." l0 Allowing AIDS-linked children to be integrated
into the regular classroom would promote for all children a greater understanding and acceptance of those with differing personal
characteristics.
Under the mandates of the EHA, both children diagnosed as having AIDS and children perceived as having AIDS would be protected
from arbitrary discrimination in the school setting. The EHA reveals a
strong preference in favor of mainstreaming. Unless a child is deemed
by her doctor to be unable to attend school, the EHA, in accordance
with the underlying values served by mainstreaming disabled children,
requires that the child be placed with her peers in the regular
classroom.
C.

The Equal Protection Clause

The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Education of the Handicapped Act prohibit discrimination against AIDS-linked children in
public schools. Federal statutes, however, do not offer the only protection for these children. This Comment argues that segregating AIDSlinked children also violates their rights under the equal protection
109
110

See Thomas, supra note 2, at 25.
Education is defined as:

the aggregate of all the processes by means of which a person develops
abilities, attitudes, and other forms of behavior of positive value in the
society in which [the person] lives . . . [and] the social process by which
people are subjected to the influence of a selected and controlled environment (especially that of the school) so that they may attain social competence and optimum individual development.
DICTIONARY OF EDUCATION 202 (3d ed. 1973), quoted in Myers & Jenson, The
Meaning of "Appropriate" EducationalProgramming Under the Educationfor All
Handicapped ChildrenAct, 1984 S. ILL. U.L.J. 401, 428. Schools clearly play a critical role in shaping a child's view of society.
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clause of the fourteenth amendment."'
The equal protection clause guarantees that no state shall "deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,"1 2
thereby mandating that "all persons similarly circumstanced shall be
treated alike.""' 3 This Comment maintains that AIDS-related children
and healthy children with no link to AIDS are similarly situated with
regard to AIDS, because neither group can transfer the disease in the
normal, unrestricted school setting. Thus, by classifying AIDS-linked
children in a discriminatory manner, a resolution such as the one proposed in New York City" 4 denies these children their constitutional
right to equal protection of the laws and burdens them with a stigmatizing classification. Whether the examining court chooses to apply
strict scrutiny or an intermediate level of scrutiny to legislation barring
AIDS-related children from regular classes, or whether a higher level
of deference is deemed to be proper, the court should find that such
15
legislation denies to these children equal protection of the law.
1. Strict Scrutiny
In order for a court to apply strict scrutiny in reviewing a regulation that segregates AIDS-linked children from their peers, the regulation must either adversely affect a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution, or operate to the disadvantage of
a discrete class of people that is a "suspect class.""' 6 In order to with"" Courts generally will avoid deciding a case by constitutional interpretation
where statutory grounds exist on which to base the decision. See, e.g., Spector Motor
Service v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944). Nevertheless, an argument on behalf
of AIDS-linked children segregated from the regular classroom can certainly be made
with respect to the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Concededly,
the chances of proving a violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 or the EHA are
much greater. This Comment, however, simply presents all the bases on which an antisegregation action may lie.
112

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,

§ 1.

...F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
11. See supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
" A court may choose from three levels of scrutiny in reviewing legislation alleged to violate the equal protection clause. The choice depends on the nature of the
challenged legislation. If a statute affects a "suspect class" or impinges on a "fundamental right," the statute will be strictly scrutinized. If a "classification, while not
facially invidious, nonetheless give[s] rise to recurring constitutional difficulties," Plyler
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 (1982), the legislation will be reviewed under an intermediate level of scrutiny. If neither strict scrutiny nor intermediate scrutiny is appropriate,
the legislation will be reviewed under a rational relation standard, which accords great
deference to legislative judgment. See generally G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 670-76 (10th ed. 1980) (discussing the historical development of equal protection analysis).
"16 See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973).
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stand strict scrutiny, the legislative body that passes such a regulation
must demonstrate that the classification scheme is necessary to promote
a compelling government interest, and that it is precisely and narrowly
tailored to serve legitimate objectives. 117
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,"' the
Supreme Court ruled that education is not a fundamental right; despite
its "undisputed importance," it is "not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution."" 9 One of the two
bases for applying the strict scrutiny standard to allegedly discriminatory AIDS legislation is therefore unavailable. AIDS-linked children
do, however, appear to fit the definition traditionally used to describe a
suspect class. This Comment argues that AIDS-linked children constitute a suspect class and government efforts to segregate them from their
normal classrooms should be reviewed under a standard of strict
scrutiny.1

20

A government regulation that classifies all AIDS-linked children
so as to automatically bar them from their regular schoolrooms 2 ' fits
the definition of suspectness presented by Justice Brennan in Plyler v.
Doe.'2 2 Such a classification

reflect[s] deep-seated prejudice rather than legislative rationality in pursuit of some legitimate objective. Legislation
predicated on such prejudice is easily recognized as incompatible with the constitutional understanding that each person is to be judged individually and is entitled to equal justice under the law .

.

.. Legislation imposing special

disabilities upon groups disfavored by virtue or circumstances beyond their control suggests the kind of "class or
caste" treatment that the Fourteenth Amendment was
117
11s
119

See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217.
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
Id. at 35.

Although it is extremely unlikely that the Court would agree to classify AIDSlinked children as a suspect class, see infra text accompanying note 127, a discussion of
the strict scrutiny standard as applied to such children is instructive nevertheless. Even
if the Court refuses to classify such children as a suspect group, a finding that the
children fit generally within the definition that traditionally has been used by the Court
to describe a suspect class will make it more likely that the Court would categorize the
children as a "quasi-suspect" class. Such categorization would require that any segregation of the class be subject to an intermediate level of review.
121 For an example of such a regulation, enacted by a community school board,
see supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
122 457 U.S. 202 (1982). Although Plyler was decided on the basis of intermediate
scrutiny, Justice Brennan included in his discussion of the equal protection clause the
definition of suspectness quoted in the text.
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designed to abolish.12
The government regulation described above would create stark differences between the treatment of AIDS-linked children and non-AIDSlinked children. Furthermore, AIDS-linked children would all be classified under one category, although no medical justification exists for
such uniform treatment. Indeed, the only justifiable classification
scheme would be one that distinguished between those children who are
deemed by their physicians to be well enough to attend school, and
those who are deemed to be physically unable to do so.
Such a government regulation would promote no government interest at all, much less a compelling one, as is required to withstand
strict scrutiny. The medical evidence presently available indicates that
there is no practical risk of transmission in the normal school setting.
No government interest exists in removing, and in effect quarantining,
AIDS-linked children from their normal environments. A permissible
government objective of such segregation might be to protect a child
diagnosed as having AIDS from contracting a potentially harmful disease from her peers in school. This objective should not be achieved,
however, by simply barring all children with AIDS from the classroom.
The risks of infection should be weighed separately for each AIDS patient, as the risks differ in every case.
Furthermore, automatic removal of AIDS-linked children from
their normal classrooms must fail under a standard of strict scrutiny,
because it is not narrowly tailored; such segregation is, in fact, fatally
flawed in that it is both overinclusive and underinclusive. It is overinclusive in that it restricts AIDS-linked children entirely, because none
can transmit the disease by the casual contact that occurs in the classroom. It is also overinclusive in that it bars from the classroom diagnosed AIDS patients who have been deemed by their physicians to be
healthy enough to attend school. Automatic removal is underinclusive
in that it fails to segregate many who in fact may be carriers of AIDS,
"I3Id. at 216 n.14. AIDS-linked children arguably constitute a "discrete and insular" minority, United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
They form a clearly defined and bounded group with an "immutable" characteristic,
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). The disability thrust upon them as
a result of their exclusion from the regular classroom is certainly harmful. Furthermore, from a political perspective, AIDS-linked children are a particularly vulnerable
group: as children, they have no voting power; over half are black and almost onequarter are hispanic; most are indigent and have at least one parent infected with
AIDS. Many have a parent who is an intravenous drug user. See WEEKLY SURVEILLANCE REPORT, supra note 19, at 2. Given these conditions, AIDS-related children
seem to be in "such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary
protection from the majoritarian political process." Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28 (discussing the "traditional indicia of suspectness").
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such as untested children who are infected with the HTLV-III virus""
but are asymptomatic, or children who have been very recently contaminated with the virus and would therefore generate negative antibody
test results. 2 ' Because AIDS-linked children can be classified as a suspect group, a government regulation that automatically deprives these
children of the benefits of a meaningful public education is "presumptively invidious"' 12 and therefore unconstitutional under the fourteenth
amendment.
2.

Intermediate Scrutiny

Although strict scrutiny seems to be an appropriate standard to
apply to a government regulation that automatically bars AIDS-linked
children from their regular classrooms, it is necessary to consider alternative standards, as the Court traditionally has been extremely reluctant to name any class as suspect.' 2 Accordingly, one must examine the
other levels of scrutiny used by the Court, in order to determine
whether such action would be unconstitutional at these levels as well.
The Court has applied a standard of heightened scrutiny in cases
where government classifications affect neither a fundamental right nor
a suspect class, but nonetheless "give rise to recurring constitutional
difficulties.' 28 Although strict scrutiny does not apply, any regulation
examined under a standard of heightened scrutiny must serve an important government objective and must be substantially related to
achieving that objective.' 29 Several courts of appeals and commentators
have acknowledged that an intermediate level of deference has been applied to "legislative restrictions on access to education." x30 The particuAlthough it may be possible to remedy this underinclusiveness by subjecting all
schoolchildren to the HTLV-III antibody test, a mandatory blood testing program
would be unwise. Since AIDS is not transmissible in the classroom, there is no need to
124

test children. In fact, the antibody test should not be used diagnostically because it is
not completely accurate and false positive readings may result. It cannot test for the

presence of AIDS, nor can it predict anything about the possibility of transmitting
AIDS. See AIDS: A SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 14-17. A positive test result
would only cause unnecessary fear, stigmatization, and ostracism. Finally, mandatory

blood testing arguably violates an individual's right to privacy. See Note, supra note 35,
at 1287-89 (criticizing mandatory blood testing programs).
125

See AIDS: A

12

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982).

127

Only classifications based on "race, alienage or national origin" have been con-

SPECIAL REPORT,

supra note 11, at 17.

sidered suspect. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3255

(1985).

128

Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217.

See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). The Court invalidated an
Oklahoma statute which discriminated on the basis of gender as being insubstantially
related to achieving the purported governmental objective. See id. at 199-204.
"' Sklar v. Byrne, 727 F.2d 633, 637 n.5 (7th Cir. 1984); Halderman v. Penn129
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lar case to which these authorities refer is Plyler v. Doe, 3 1 which involved a Texas statute that denied a public education to
"undocumented" alien children.' 3 2 Although the majority opinion referred to a framework of rational relation in its decision to strike down
the statute, the Court's requirement that the statute further a "substantial state interest"' 3 3 clearly indicates that the statute was reviewed
34
under a standard of heightened scrutiny.1
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, evaluated the impor-'
tance of education:
Public education is not a "right" granted to individuals
by the Constitution. But neither is it merely some governmental "benefit." . . . [E]ducation has a fundamental role in
maintaining the fabric of our society. We cannot ignore the
significant social costs borne by our Nation when select
groups are denied the means to absorb the values and skills
upon which our social order rests.
In addition . . . denial of education to some isolated
group of children poses an affront to one of the goals of the
Equal Protection Clause: the abolition of governmental barriers presenting unreasonable obstacles to advancement on
the basis of individual merit. . . . The inestimable toll of
that deprivation on the social, economic, intellectual, and
psychological well-being of the individual, and the obstacle it
poses to individual achievement, make it most difficult to reconcile the cost or the principle of a status-based denial of
basic education with the framework of equality embodied in
hurst State School and Hosp., 707 F.2d 702, 709 n.7. (3d Cir. 1983) (citations omitted)
(the right of parents "to direct and control the upbringing of their children without
unnecessary governmental interference" is protected under "an 'intermediate' level of

scrutiny"); see also Comment, Intermediate Equal Protection Scrutiny of Welfare
Laws that Deny Subsistence, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1547, 1555-60 (1984) (interpreting
Plyler as implicitly holding that denial of a very important interest closely related to the
exercise of constitutional rights probably triggers intermediate scrutiny).
131

457 U.S. 202 (1982).

See id. at 205.
133 Id. at 230.
134 It is possible that the majority simply would have preferred to have stated
explicitly that education is a fundamental right. In order to obtain Justice Powell's
vote, however, it was probably necessary to avoid such a statement; Powell had voted
with the majority in San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973),
which held that education is not a fundamental right. See id. at 35. Indeed, the dissenters in Plyler asserted that the Plyler majority had applied a "quasi-suspect-class and
quasi-fundamental-rights analysis." Plyler, 457 U.S. at 242, 244 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
132
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5

Equality of educational opportunity traditionally has been recognized as a highly important attribute of education. In Plyler, Justice
Brennan addressed the complete denial of a.public education to a group
of children. In contrast, the AIDS-related regulations with which this
Comment is concerned do not purport to wholly deny formal learning
to AIDS-linked children, as home instruction would be available for
these children."' 8 Despite the probable contention of the school board,
however, that these children would be receiving an education equivalent
to that of their peers, any government regulation that automatically
segregates or bars such children from their regular classrooms clearly
violates the spirit of the equal protection clause."' 7 These children are
denied a meaningful opportunity to enjoy a benefit granted to others.
The exclusion operates to prevent them from ever fully assimilating
into society. Isolated from other children at a young age, AIDS-linked
children will feel permanently alienated from a society that has separated them from their peers.
In the absence of medical evidence that AIDS can be spread by
casual contact, one important government interest, the protection of
healthy children from contracting the disease, is not implicated. Another government objective, to protect AIDS-diagnosed children from
contracting potentially harmful diseases in school, need not be achieved
by summarily barring all such children from the schoolroom." 8' Indeed,
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221-22 (citations omitted).
The resolution passed by a community school board in Queens, New York,
provides that the children be educated under a program of home instruction. See Addendum, supra note 39.
"' See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Although the Brown
decision specifically prohibited racial segregation in public schools, the Court broadly
stated:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
138

governments .

. .

. [Ilt is a principal instrument in awakening the child to

cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in
helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is
doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he
is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the
state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be available to all
on equal terms ..

We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.
Id. at 493, 495.
138 See supra text accompanying note 104. As discussed earlier, each AIDS child
should be assessed individually by a physician to determine whether she may attend
school. If an AIDS-linked child is deemed to be capable of attending school, govern-
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no reasonable basis exists for segregating every AIDS-linked child from
the normal classroom. Under an intermediate level of scrutiny, then,
the type of government regulation at issue must fail.
3.

Rationality Standard

If a court reviewing the regulation in question considers neither
strict scrutiny nor intermediate scrutiny to be the applicable standard,
the regulation would be tested under the rationality standard. This
standard applies to regulations that are not based upon a "suspect classification," do not affect a "fundamental right," and do not involve a
"quasi-suspect" category. Under the rational relation standard, the
court would determine whether the classification at issue bears a rational relation to a legitimate public purpose. 39 The Supreme Court
traditionally has granted considerable legislative deference to government regulations reviewed under this standard. Recently, however, the
Court has demonstrated its willingness to strike down classification
1 40
schemes that are not rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.
The question with respect to AIDS-linked children is whether it is
rational to treat such children differently from their peers. It is true
that children diagnosed as having AIDS suffer a disability not shared
by others; in the classroom setting, however, their particular disability
does not warrant the distinction imposed by the government regulation
at issue. Although the purpose of such regulations, the prevention of
the spread of AIDS, is a legitimate end, it is not rationally served by
distinguishing between AIDS-linked children and non-AIDS-linked
children within the educational setting. The Supreme Court recently
asserted: "The state may not rely on a classification whose relationship
to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary
or irrational. 1' 4 1 In the case of AIDS-linked children in the regular
school setting, medical evidence clearly shows that allowing such children to remain with their peers would not pose any threat to the public's legitimate interests. A government regulation that would automatimental regulation that arbitrarily bars such a child from the classroom is violative of
the equal protection clause.
"I See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3254 (1985).
140 Last Term, the Court invalidated several laws under the rationality standard.
See, e.g., id. at 3258-60 (zoning ordinance requiring a special permit to maintain a
group home for the mentally retarded); Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 105 S.
Ct. 2862 (1985) (state statute granting tax exemptions only to Vietnam veterans who
had resided within the state prior to a certain date); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Ward, 105 S. Ct. 1676 (1985) (law promoting state's domestic business by discriminating against foreign corporations).
141 Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3258.
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cally bar them from the classroom fails to withstand equal protection
review even under a rationality standard.14 2
CONCLUSION

Medical evidence currently available indicates that AIDS is transmitted only by sexual contact, the sharing of hypodermic needles, blood
transfusions, and in utero infection from a mother to her offspring.
There appears to be absolutely no risk of spreading the disease by casual contact, such as that which occurs in the classroom. In addition, the
risk that a child diagnosed as having AIDS will contract a potentially
harmful disease from her peers in school should be assessed on an individual basis. School administrators who arbitrarily segregate all AIDSlinked children from their classmates are yielding to the pressure of
uninformed public fear. 4" By preventing these children from obtaining
the full measure of educational benefits to which they are entitled, a
school board acts in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the
Education of the Handicapped Act, and the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment. Instead of classifying such children as a single group, proper authorities should separately assess each AIDSlinked child to determine the most appropriate educational placement
for that child.
142 In Cleburne, the majority held that the mentally retarded are neither a suspect
class nor a quasi-suspect class because they are not a discrete group of people, do not
suffer prejudice, and are not without the political power that traditionally characterizes
a suspect class. See id. at 3256-57. Also, the Court stated that it did not want to set a
precedent that might hold for similar groups. See id. at 3257-58. Although the Court
reviewed legislation affecting the mentally retarded under a "mere rationality" standard, it declared such legislation to be violative of the equal protection clause because
no rational basis existed for the regulation in question. See id. at 3258-60.
For purposes of equal protection analysis, AIDS-linked children are situated analogously to mentally retarded persons. Thus, as discussed in the text, see supra text
accompanying. notes 139-42, if a strict scrutiny analysis or an intermediate level of
deference is not used to review governmental regulation arbitrarily barring AIDSlinked children from the classroom, such regulation would certainly fail under a rationality standard of review.
A New York trial court recently asserted: "Absent any rational basis for . . . [the]
proposed exclusion [from school] of only known AIDS cases or carriers of the virus,
without imposing such exclusion in the case of ARC patients or asymptomatic carriers[,] . . . such a proposal must be deemed a denial of equal protection of the laws."
District 27 Community School Bd. v. Board of Educ., 130 Misc. 2d 398, 416, 502
N.Y.S.2d 325, 337 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
143 Giovanni Boccaccio, describing the bubonic plague that devastated fourteenth
century Europe, wrote: "The events . . . caused various fears among those people who
survived, all tending to the same cruel and uncharitable end which was to avoid the sick
and everything that had been near them. . . . And the public distress was such that all
laws, whether human or divine, were ignored." See Finegold, ProtectingHealth Personnel, in THE Airs EPIDEMIC 123, 124 (K. Cahill ed. 1983).
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There is no evidence that AIDS has ever been contracted through
casual contact. This society must not allow an innocent minority to be
ruled by a misinformed majority. The consequences of segregating
AIDS-linked children and unjustifiably granting them an inferior education "may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
1 44

undone."

144 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954), quoted in San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70, 71-72 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).

